ogy of essays in America First!, I was remindedrnof this fact. Those pohticalrnhabits Kauffman defends as “repubhean”rnor “popuHst” were axiomatic forrnmost Americans 100 years ago. Nowrnthey arc presented as a rediscovered legacy:rnwhat Kauffman calls neo-isolationismrnwas once a corollary of decentralizedrnpolitical society with a constitutionallyrnlimited federal government. Like otherrnpaleoconservatives, Kauffman believesrnthat the American republic did notrnsimply yield to public administration orrnto a “democratic” empire. Rather, it wasrncommandeered by intellectuals andrnpoliticians who profited from the metamorphosis.rnThe truth lies somewhere in betweenrnKauffman and Schlesinger, albeit closerrnto the former than the latter. Historicalrnforces, socioeconomic and demographic,rnpushed us into becoming a bureaucratizedrnempire, and much of that changernoccurred with popular endorsement.rnBut the result has been a distinctly undemocraticrnregime—in the sense that itrndocs not allow true self-government—rnunder which those shared powers mandatedrnby the constitution have witheredrnaway.rnAn illustration of the disagreementrnbetween neo- and paleoconservatives isrnREADERS!rnyou have rnfriends or relativesrnwho may enjoyrnChronicles,rnplease send us theirrnnames andrnaddresses.rnWe would bernpleased to sendrnthem arncomplimentaryrnissue!rnthe discrepancy between their respectivernconcepts of a free market. Both campsrnprofess belief in the free market economy,rnthough for one it is compatible withrnan extensive federal welfare state butrnnot protectionism, while for the otherrnprotectionism but not the existent welfarernstate fits with a sensible politicalrneconomy. The reasons for this have partlyrnto do with historical associations. Neoconservatives,rnas social democratic internationalists,rnsee government-brokeredrntrade agreements as useful in overcomingrnpolitical and cultural differences,rnwhile leaving the welfare state intact;rnat least some paleoconservatives regardrntariffs as a legitimate source of governmentrnrevenue, and protection forrn”American jobs.” But the opponents ofrnhigh tariffs in the Progressive and NewrnDeal eras typically favored the creationrnand extension of “internal” revenuesrnwhich would be collected not at the bordersrnbut throughout the country. Bigrngovernment advocates, like Wilson andrnthe two Roosevelts, called for reducingrntariffs, while vastly increasing otherrnrevenues. Whence the semantic impasse:rnneoconservatives like CharlesrnKrauthammer accuse paleoconservativesrnof being fascist eorporativists for rejectingrnNAFTA, while paleoconservativesrnlike Pat Buchanan mock neoconservativesrnfor combing social democracy withrnindifference to American workers.rnThe intellectuals described byrnEhrman and their predecessors in thernProgressive Era misrepresented the subversionrnthat was taking place. Far morerninsidiously than the plodding fanaticsrnwho were exposed as communists, thernliberal internationalists derailed thernAmerican experiment in self-government.rnThey made it unfashionable andrneven immoral to distinguish betweenrnpopular self-government and executiverndictatorships “preparing” great leaps forward.rnThose who make a distinction betweenrnthe two are not likely to write forrnForeign Affairs or National Interest. Inrntwo polemics published in Commentary,rnone in 1986 and the other in 1988, wernlearn that traditional American conservativesrnare the “heirs of the Christianrnand aristocratic Middle Ages.” WhilernEhrman accepts this questionable generalization,rnhe also describes paleoconservativesrnas “heirs to Robert Taft and therntradition of midwestern isolationism.”rnTraditional conservatives, he says, arern”suspicious of internationalism, let alonernany hint of Wilsonian crusade.” In pointrnof fact, the war on and for the right is beingrnfought entirely within the horizon ofrnpolitical modernity, between traditionalrnAmerican republicans and the heirs ofrnWilson’s “democratic” imperialism.rnThose on the right who have not beenrnconverted to the “vital center” are contestingrnthe ascendanc’ of the Schlesingeritesrnnow posing as conservatives.rnWithout practicing deeonstruction, onerncan easily tease this out of Ehrman’s text.rnPaul Gottfried is a professor ofrnhumanities at Elizabethtown Collegernin Pennsylvania.rnDoll Studiesrnby William J. Watkins, Jr.rnForced Justice: SchoolrnDesegregation and the Lawrnby David ]. ArmorrnNew York: Oxford University Press;rn271 pp., $35.00rnIn 1954, the Supreme Court held inrnBrown v. Board of Education that thernstate-sponsored segregation of childrenrnin public schools was a violation of thernEqual Protection Clause of the 14thrnAmendment, and thus unconstitutional.rnThe Court reasoned that segregationrn”generates a feeling of inferiority … thatrnmay affect their [black children’s] heartsrnand minds in a way unlikely ever to bernundone.” The decision, based more onrnfashionable social science than law, overturnedrna 58-year-old precedent andrnshocked much of the nation.rnBrown was the first salvo of an all-outrnassault on what remained of our dualrnsystem of government. The power of thernjudiciary expanded exponentially—rncourts replaced local elected schoolrnboards and began to make decisions regardingrnthe hiring of faculty, busing,rnschool locations, resource allocation,rnand the placement of public housing.rnAccording to the conventional wisdom,rnthis was necessary because mixed-racernschools would be socially and educationallyrnbeneficial to all concerned. Integrationrnwould raise black self-esteem, eliminaternprejudice through racial contact,rnand improve black academic perfor-rn34/CHRONlCLESrnrnrn