OPINIONSrnFive Votesrnby Gregory J. Sullivanrn”Much law, but little justice.”rn—Thomas FullerrnA Justice for All: William J. Brennan,rnJr., and the Decisions ThatrnTransformed Americarnby Kim Isaac KislerrnNew York: Simon & Schuster.rn303 pp., $22.00rnWith fi c votes around liere yourncan do anything,” JusticernWilliam Brennan told his law clerks, thusrnsummarizing the quintessence of Brennanism,rnThat constitutional law is notrnsomething derived from the text, structure,rnand histor’ of the various provisionsrnof the Constitution but rather arncreation of the ad^itrarv personal views ofrnthe Justices—this, for the past 30 vcars orrnso, has been the crux of Brennan’s radicalrnegalitarianism. Kim Isaac Eisler’s biographicalrnportrait, A justice for AH,rntliough a vcrv mediocre studv of Brennan’srnpolitical—it can hardly be calledrnjurisprudential—thought, provides arnCregory /. Sullivan practices law inrnI’renton, New jersey.rngood opportunity to examine the decisionsrnthat, as Eisler’s subtitle states,rntransformed America.rnBrennan had a conentional legalrncareer following his graduation fromrnHarvard I .aw School and prior to his appointmentrnto New Jersey’s state trialrnbench and subsec]uent elexation to thernNew Jersey Supreme Court (which wasrnnot then but has since become an appallingrnBrennanite tribunal). WhenrnBrennan arrived on the U.S. SupremernCourt in 1956, he fell into the middle ofrnthe struggle between the conservativernFelix Frankfurter and the liberal HugornBlack. Eisler’s misundcrstandmg ofrnFrankfurter is appalling. At one point hernobtusely says: “Frankfurter in no wayrnconnected the role of being a ‘justice’rnwith the concept of ‘justice.'” But Frankfurterrnunderstood his role perfectly. “Irndo not conceive that it is mv function torndecide cases on my notion of justice. Ifrnit were, 1 wouldn’t be as confident asrnsome others are that I knew exactly whatrnjustice required in a particular ease.”rnThis is a concise statement of the doctrinernof judicial restraint, whereby thernjurist subordinates his personal sense ofrnjustice to the law of the Constitution.rnThis view was soon to be overrun by thernegregious activism of the Warren Court.rnBlack rather easily won the battle forrnBrennan’s soul, but Brennan movedrnfar beyond Black’s simplemindcd andrnselective constitutional literalism. Black,rnfor all his flaws, attempted to root hisrniews in the Constitution; Brennan, byrncontrast, virtually ceased bothering withrnthe Constitution in any meaningful way.rnMoreover, Brennan moved quickly intornthe position of intellectual architectrnof the Warren Court’s revolution, forrnJustice William Douglas was too contentiousrnand Warren himself was not byrnany means a legal scholar—he was, tornuse the accurate if uncharitable phrasernof Judge Learned Hand, a “big dumbrnSwede.” Eisler concentrates on a handfulrnof opinions that Brennan cither wroternor helped to shape, and they proxidernoutstanding instances of unfettered judicialrnpower in crucial areas of the law.rnReapportionment. In Baker v. Carrrn(1962), Brennan created a new politicalrnorder with this watershed apportionmentrn)UNE 1994/27rnrnrn