clear violations of international law, andrnthe aggressor should be punished. Tornthis end the United Nations, often led byrnthe United States, has imposed sanctionsrnon Serbia, maintained an arms embargo,rna no-fl- zone, and brought other formsrnof psychological pressure to bear. Inrnsome ways the situation is analogous tornthat of Iraq or Libya.rnThe second popular view is that thernconflict in Yugoslavia is really a civil war,rnbased on hatreds that have been kept inrna deep freeze by a totalitarian state.rnWith the fall of communism, thesernethnic conflicts have sprung up like repressedrncoil springs. This view is held inrnEurope and Canada, precisely thoserncountries that have committed troops tornU.N. peacekeeping efforts. In 1992, thernEuropeans tried to negotiate an ethnicrnpartition of Bosnia into cantons; althoughrnthey subsequentlv recognizedrnBosnia as an independent republic,rnthey continued to maintain that only arnpolitical compromise could bring peace.rnHence their forces in Yugoslavia arernthere for humanitarian reasons: to maintainrnsome sort of cease-fire so that essentialrnsupplies can be brought to civilianrnpopulations and to set an atmospherernconducive to talks among the contendingrnforces.rnThere are obvious contradictions inrnboth of these theories. First, one may askrnthat if it is permissible for Croatia andrnBosnia to secede from Yugoslavia, arnCULTURALrnENRICHMENTrnAccording to the November 1995 issuernof Border Watch, citizens living inrnthe southernmost areas of Arizonarnare suffering repeated attacks fromrnMexican bandits who take advantagernof the porous border to slip into thernUnited States in search of prey.rnAlthough families have had theirrnhomes invaded and have beenrnrobbed at gunpoint, a local rancherrnwho tried to get the goxernment torntake action found that “the U.S.rngovernment will not act for fear ofrndisturbing relations with Mexico.”rnmember in good standing of the UnitedrnNations and one with internationally recognizedrnborders, why is it not permissiblernfor Serbian Bosnia to secede from a republicrnwhich had never existed beforernand whose borders had been drawnrninitially by a communist dictator? As forrnthe theory of age-old enmities, some of itrnis simply not true. The Yugoslavia thatrnarose after World War I was a result ofrnthe Pan-Slavism popular at that time.rnThe Slovenes and Croats, anxious to divorcernthemselves from the Austrians andrnHungarians, felt they had much in commonrnwith their Serbian cousins. True,rnthere had been considerable animus betweenrnTurk and Serb for over 500 years,rnbut in modern Yugoslavia both Muslimsrnand Serbs coexisted reasonably well,rnwith a significant rate of intermarriage.rnThe Muslims did not call themselvesrnTurks, and the term Yugoslav was popularrnin both groups. (Of greater import, ofrncourse, was the carnage of World War II,rnin which the Serbs suffered huge lossesrnof population.)rnDr. Woodward states that the Yugoslavrnconflict is the result of transformingrna planned economy to a marketrneconomy, and of a one-party authoritarianrnstate to a multiparty democracy. Further,rnin a countrv where there is no majorityrnand everyone is a member of arnminority, the preservation of humanrnrights becomes paramount. As difficultrnas the problem was, it became even morernso with the changing international scene.rnYugoslavia as one of the leaders of thernThird World had been able to profitrnfrom the Cold War by receiving assistancernfrom both sides. Despite this prolongedrneconomic aid, however, it couldrnnever keep its economy consistentlyrnhealthy, and found itself in a foreignrndebt crisis just as the Cold War was endingrnand the deep pockets of the UnitedrnStates and the Soviet Union werernclosing.rnAll through its post-World War II existence,rnYugoslavia juggled with politicalrnreforms, at one time centralizing itsrneconomy, at other times decentralizing,rnbut regardless of which way the pendulumrnswung, further reform seemed alwaysrnnecessary. In time the decentralizationrnmomentum became enormous, tornthe detriment of the federal government,rnwhere both its resources and itsrnproblem-solving ability were concerned,rnso that finally that government, bereftrnof authority, became a hollow symbol.rnThus, concludes Woodward, it was a failurernof political mechanisms that broughtrnabout the collapse of Yugoslavia and thernbreakup of the republics into ethnic entities.rnThe West exacerbated the situationrnby failing to recognize that only throughrnthe federal government could Yugoslavia’srnproblems be contained, and,rnby assuming ethnic animosity to be therncentral problem, the West virtuallyrnassured that it would become so.rnWoodward feels that supranational institutionsrnrequiring sustained interactionrnamong people and sovereign states is thernbest system for resolving disputes. Thusrna plan for the confederation of CroatianrnBosnia with Croatia, and Serbian Bosniarnwith Serbia (vetoed by Germany and thernUnited States because it “rewarded aggression”),rnseems to her a promising firstrnstep toward a greater Balkan confederation.rnShe is, of course, right, but while werncan refrain from damaging a country’srncapacity to govern, one may wonder howrnthe West can improve that capacity.rnEconomic aid has been the traditionalrnmethod, and sometimes it has worked.rnWhether we have sufficient resourcesrnnow to try to do that in the Balkansrnis questionable, and whether HumptyrnDumpty can ever be put back together isrnequally doubtful. Nevertheless, somernform of cooperation or confederationrnmay eventually arise, and if so, the kindrnof knowledge Woodward provides usrnwould be immenselv helpful in nurturingrnit.rnSol Schindler is a retired Foreign ServicernOfficer.rnFreedom of Accessrnby John LukacsrnStalin’s Letters to Molotov 1925-1936rnTranslated by Katherine A. Fitzpatrick,rnEdited by Lars T. Lih andrnOleg V. NaumovrnNew Haven: Yale Universitv Press;rn304 pp., $25.00 ‘rnThough the “opening” of the Russianrnarchives is supposed to be a blessingrnfor historians, there are plenty of reasonsrnfor skepticism. To begin with, “open” isrnan inaccurate term. What is available isrnselective, for so much remains closed.rn36/CHRONICLESrnrnrn