He spent virtually his whole subsequentncareer in defense-related science.nWatson admitted under questioningnto having had numerous faceto-facenmeetings with four differentnRussian KGB agents but said it was tonlearn more about the Soviet Union. Hennever admitted to having been a spynbut was transferred out of defensenwork, ostensibly for failing to disclosenhis Communist background or that ofnhis wife and daughter. There werenothers like Watson, and Wright becamendisliked.nLord Trend, a former Cabinet minister,nwas asked in late 1974 to reviewnall of the evidence about penetrations,nand Hollis in particular. He interviewednWright on several occasions butnhis report apparently was not finishednuntil after Wright left the service innJanuary 1976. In 1981 MargaretnThatcher said to the House of Commonsnthat Lord Trend concluded thatnHollis was not a spy. Wright has this tonsay of it: “He had faith in a man’sninnocence as I had faith in hisntreachery. . . . Only facts will evernclear up the eternal mystery.” Hisnstudy remained an official secret.nWright’s central message seems to benthat the British intelligence agenciesnnever took the time to check outnpeople’s backgrounds before entrustingnthem with secrets. In classic cases ofnvetting, it was enough if the person wasnfrom Cambridge and had acquaintancesnin the government. Unlike Penrosenand Simon, Wright never advocatesnAmerican-style publicity and congressionalninvestigations on intelligence. Ofncourse, his book has caused a furor innBritain, but that is nothing comparednto the damage done by the Cambridgenold-boy network which Wright describes.nAnother theme emerging fromnthese books has to do with the conflictingndemands of diplomacy, foreignnintelligence gathering, and counterintelligence.nThis conflict becomes mostnapparent in expulsions, the ultimatenugly stick of counterintelligence. Ifnlarge numbers of foreign spies arenknown to be operating illegally, itnseems appropriate to throw them out.nBut other agencies who run spies overseasncounsel patience, lest their spiesnare thrown out in reprisal. The diplomatsnhate expulsions because it foulsnup their mission: to improve relationsnand encourage trade. As it is, war givesnone set of priorities, while peace givesnanother.nFinding anything is hard to do if youndo not believe it exists and consider itnof no importance. And so most of usndo not believe our friends and associatesncould be Soviet spies, nor do wenthink it important to test that propositionnregularly. Those whose job is toncatch spies must hold such beliefs andnconduct such tests. It seems a mostnunfriendly and unwanted task, especiallynin times of peace, ease, andnaffluence.nYet conservative estimates put SovietnBloc spies in the United States at overn1,000. This count does not includenillegals (those with totally fictitiousnidentities who entered the countrynwithout diplomatic, trade, cultural, ornother cover), visitors, or those Americansnwho have been recruited. SixteennAmericans were prosecuted as spies inn1984-85, but there is no way to guessnhow many other Americans are nownproviding secrets to the Soviets. Thenalienation and anti-Americanism onnthe college campuses in the 1980’sncoupled with the war in Central Americanseems disturbingly similar to thenBritish experience of the I930’s. Wencan only hope that American intelligencenagencies are up to the challengenand are receiving the necessary supportnin this new era oi glasnost.nHatchingnArmageddonnby Matthew KaufmannThe Arms Control Delusion bynSenator Malcolm Wallop andnAngelo Codevilla, San Francisco:nInstitute for Contemporary StudiesnPress; $16.95.nAmong public officials, “the arms controlnprocess” is sacrosanct. The minoritynare willing to voice relatively narrow andnlegalistic complaints about specific treaties,nnever failing to assure us of theirnsupport for arms control per se andntheir eagerness to go back and get an”better” treaty. Their case, however,nwould be considerably enhanced werenthey to argue that the entire armsncontrol process is a dangerous diversionnnnfrom the constant, and growing, Sovietnthreat; but this is a truth none darenspeak.nOr almost none. Senator MalcolmnWallop and national-security expertnAngelo Codevilla have produced annew book which calls the Americannattitude towards arms control by itsnproper name: delusion. “To believe innarms control,” they write, “is to acceptnthat a nation possessed of serious reasons,nand weapons, for fighting anotherncan and will set aside those reasonsnlong enough to deprive itself of thosenweapons. Little by little, so goes thencreed, as the means disappear fromntheir hands and as they become accustomednto feeling less and less threatened,nthat nation’s leaders will alsondiscard the reasons why they armed innthe first place.” Our main problem isnnot that the Soviets are possessed of andevilish cleverness with which to bamboozlenus. Rather, “the arms controlnprocess is something we do to ourselves,nlargely by ourselves.”nVerification, the subject of most criticismnof arms treaties, is among thenleast of our troubles. Enforcement is angreater one; the U.S. invariably fails tonrespond to Soviet treaty violations, exceptnby seeking more treaties. Moreover,nour reluctance to disrupt “thenspirit of the arms control process” hasnallowed the Soviets to attain superioritynwhile staying mostly within the letter ofntreaties. The goal of American armsncontrollers is not security but formalnagreement. Knowing this, the Sovietsnhold out for a treaty imposing fewnconstraints (they rarely have to waitnlong; Americans do not like to makenproposals they think Moscow will findndisagreeable) and take full advantage ofntheir legal running room, while thenU.S. indulges in handwringing overnwhether American armament violatesn”the spirit of the process.”nEventually, one would think, ournleaders might face reality and cut theirnlosses. Yet so heavily have many politiciansninvested in arms control, saynWallop and Codevilla,nthat to speak of alternatives tonarms control is to speak ofnalternatives to them personally.nWhenever one discusses thenfailure of arms controlnagreements to bring about ansafer world, even if one blamesnAUGUST 1388 / 35n