Some of the articles are straightforwardnand without bias. Richard A.nWehmhoefer does an excellent job ofnexplaining water law in the Southwestnand giving the historical precedent fornit, as does Albert E. Utton in his studynof Mexican-American water relations.nOther articles, as one would expect in anbook largely written by professors ofnpolitical science and public administration,nare heavily slanted in favor ofnincreased federal bureaucratic managementnand yet more congressional oversight.nAlmost all the writers end theirnchapters with a list of “suggestions”nrequiring greater government interventionnin one form or another. Several ofnthe authors seem to favor a gigantic andnexpensive federal program of waterntransfer from as far away as Arkansasnand East Texas to the Great Plains ofnwestern Oklahoma and the Panhandlenof Texas, regardless of the cost, while yetnother contributors believe the ultimatensolution to Southwestern water problemsnwill be in the courts, with arbitraryndivision of available water.nThis volume has some value. It providesnan interesting overview and annintroduction to an extremely complicatednsubject, and it is worthy of attention.nI would compliment the 17 contributorsnfor their avoidance of shrill environmentalism,nbut simultaneously I wouldnurge some special penance be devisednfor a university press that allows a studynsuch as this to appear without an index.nSmith’s book is volume three in thenUniversity of New Mexico’s Public PolicynSeries. The editor of this series isnFred Harris, once a semi-serious contendernfor the Democratic nominationnfor President and a former senator fromnOklahoma. I suggest that Harris probablynhad not read all these papers whennhe wrote in his foreword that a primaryngoal of the series is to reach not onlynscholars, students, and policymakers,nbut also the general public. Despite thensubject matter, this volume is dry reading,nand few of the general public willntry to plow through it.nOdie B. Faulk is emeritus professornof history at Northeastern StatenUniversity in Oklahoma. He now livesnin Waco, Texas.nOpen Doors, OpennQuestionsnby William R. HawkinsnBound to Lead: The ChangingnNature of American Powernby Joseph S. Nye, Jr.nNew York: Basic Books;n307 pp., $19.95nMniinany believe that the countrynis overextended and shouldnreduce its external commitments. Butnin a worid of growing interdependencenamong nations, this advice is the wrongnanswer, and U.S. decline is the wrongnquestion.” So Joseph Nye begins hisnrebuttal of those doomsayers who havenwelcomed proclamations of America’sndecline. If the nation’s loss of power andneconomic advantage can be accepted asninevitable or natural, the result of anprocess beyond control and already irreversible,nthen its leaders have no choicenbut to follow the policies of retreat,ndisarmament, and isolationism. ButnNye, the Ford Foundation professor ofninternational security at Harvard, rejectsnthis conclusion and presents a strongncase why, by the traditional accountingnof “power resources,” the United Statesnremains the dominant power on thenplanet, with no close challengers.nNye disputes the comparison, madenpopular by Paul Kennedy, of the U.S.nwith Edwardian England. Though itnruled a quarter of the globe, Englandndid not have a position as inherentlynstrong as the United States enjoys as anunified continental power. The notionnof a Pax Britannica is in Nye’s view anmyth, particularly in regard to thenestablishment of a global economicnorder through supposed liberal policiesnof “free trade”: “British gunboats occasionallynforced poor countries innwhat would today be termed the ThirdnWorld to open their ports to trade. Butnthere is a significant difference betweenncoercing distant, less-developedncountries and winning the adherencenof major European rivals.” The UnitednStates, Germany, and Russia all builtntheir economies outside of this liberalnsystem, as indeed England had originallyngained its economic advantagenunder strongly mercantilist precepts.nNye, however, underestimates England’sneconomic strength in the firstnnnhalf of the 19th century by using GNPnas the primary measurement. By thisnunrefined standard Nye has China outrankingnEngland until 1880, yet it wasnEngland that was carving China intonspheres of influence well before this.nNye does see one disturbing similaritynbetween London then and Washingtonnnow:nSo why did Britain decide itncould not afford to maintainnnaval supremacy or an adequatencontinental expeditionary force?nIn large part, it was because thenadherents of the prevailingneconomic orthodoxy believed innthe negative effects ofngovernment spending and theynparticularly opposed raisingnincome taxes. Here the analogy _tonmodern American politics isnstriking. The popular belief that .-.nBritain was suffering fromnimperial overstretch . . . causednit not to invest as well as itnmight have in the domestic andnexternal power resources thatncould have slowed its decline.nNye particularly blames British conservativesnfor adopting these views, thoughnthey “disguised that fact by keeping thensame slogans” about imperial strengthnwhile practicing appeasement. The parallelnacquires added meaning given thenmassive defense cuts proposed by thenBush administration — totaling morenthan $160 billion by 1994. Entire divisions,nair wings, and carrier groups arento be deactivated. With the door tondisarmament thus opened, it is no surprisenthat Congress has walked throughnwith an additional $100 billion in cuts.nFor all this, three justifications are commonlynmade: 1) the U.S. cannot affordnpresent force levels given the budgetndeficit; 2) military spending makes thencountry less competitive economically;nand 3) military force has lost its value innworld politics. Nye offers strong rebuttalsnto all three of them.nThe United States is spending less ofnits GNP, and of the federal budget, onndefense now than thirty years ago, andnfar less than major powers have spent innthe past; its debt, moreover, is not sonheavy relative to the underlying economynas to warrant a dangerous weakeningnof national security. Nye argues:n”Few careful and balanced economicnstudies show conclusively that defensenAUGUST 1990/39n