OPINIONSrnPost Mortemrnby Robert C. Whittenrn”A genera] who sees with the eyes of others will never be able to commandrnan army as it should be.”rn—Napoleon IrnThe Generals’ War: The Inside Storyrnof the Conflict in the Gulfrnby Michael R. Gordon andrnBernard E. TraynorrnBoston: Little, Brown; 551 pp., $27.95rnIn Senate hearings in 1991, General AlrnGray, the Marine Gorps Commandant,rnwas asked to descrifee the role ofrnthe Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1987 mandatingrn”jointness,” or the operational integrationrnof the Armed Forces, in thernPersian Gulf War. He answered that itrnhad played no role. Republican SenatorrnJohn Warner interrupted, “I don’t thinkrnyou understood the question. Let mernrephrase it for you.” Gray replied that hernhad understood the question perfectly.rn”Goldwater-Nichols played no role.” Hisrnanswer was both true and false, true inrnthat the act was not significant with respectrnto jointness, false given that Goldwater-rnNichols elevated the chairmanrnof the Joint Chiefs of Staff above thernheretofore “first among equals.” The authorsrnof The Generals’ War—respectively,rndefense correspondent for the NewrnYork Times and director of National SecurityrnPrograms at the Kennedy Schoolrnof Government at Harvard—make clearrnthe absence of jointness, and also thernflawed performance of the then-chairmanrnof the JGS, General Colin Powell,rnto whom Goldwater-Nichols assignedrnthe dominant role in the war.rnIn fact, the concept of jointness wasrnand to a large extent still is submerged inrnRobert C. Whitten is a commander, U.S.rnNaval Reserve-Retired, a national directorrnof the Navy League of the United States,rnand a research scientist, NASA-Retired.rn^tLurnU ^^9^rnVjrn^ MMrn# ! ^ ^ Mrn^ ^ ^rnthe service cultures. The Air Force, thernfirst of the Armed Forces to take majorrnoffensive action against the Iraqis, wasrnstill dominated by the theories ofrnDouhet and Mitchell 70 years and severalrnwars after their origin. The Air Forcernleaders, both military and civilian, sawrnthe conflict as a golden opportunity forrnthe service to emerge from the war as thern”senior service,” winning without assistancernfrom the ground or naval forces.rnLike the Air Force, the Navy, dominatedrnas it was by carrier admirals, had little interestrnin jointness; unlike the Air Force, itrndid not even bother with going throughrnthe motions although it did (reluctantly)rnaccept its sister sea service, the MarinernCorps. In contrast, the Marine Corpsrnwas a fully integrated team with itsrnground force, air force, and logistics unitsrnworking as equals. To point up the lackrnof integration within the Air Force, thernauthors cite the refusal of the tactical airrnwings based in Terrejon, Spain, to providernmessing and berthing facilities forrnMilitary Aidift Command (MAC) transportsrnflying troops and war materials tornthe Gulf. Similar considerations appliedrnto the various arms of both the Armyrnand the Navv. It is not surprising, then,rnthat the services found it difficult tornwork and fight in cooperation with eachrnother. Quite apart from their being disjointed,rnthe services were spooked bv thernVietnam experience.rnThe events that led to the Iraqi invasionrnof Kuwait on August 2, I99(), werernnot particulady complex. The 1980-88rnwar with Iran had been disastrouslyrnexpensive, leaving Iraq heavily in debtrndespite its great oil revenues. The poorlyrndefended emirate to the south with itsrnvast oil fields, some of which lay in disputedrnterritory, was an inviting target.rnOnce in position, the armed forces ofrnSaddam Hussein were able to subjugaternKuwait within a few days.rnPreviously, the Bush administrationrnhad viewed, and to some degree courted,rnSaddam Hussein as a counterweight tornthe Iranian mullahs. Bush appointed therncareer diplomat and Middle East expertrnApril Glaspie as ambassador to Iraq withrna charge to continue conciliatory efforts.rnThe attitude of the Bush administrationrnwas ambiguous right up to the onset ofrnhostilities: it wanted to court SaddamrnHussein as a counterweight to Iran, but itrndid not wish to see him expand beyondrnhis current borders. When military in-rn28/CHRONICLESrnrnrn