REVIEWSrnRoots of a NewrnWorld Orderrnby William R. HawkinsrnTo End All Wars: Woodrow Wilsonrnand the Quest for a New World Orderrnby Thomas ]. KnockrnNew York: Oxford University Press;rn381 pp., $30.00rnThough Thomas Knock draws nornexplicit comparisons betweenrnWoodrow Wilson’s plans for a post-rnGreat War world and the policies GeorgernBush tried to fashion for a post-ColdrnWar world, his use of the term “NewrnWodd Order” in the title of his book isrnclearly meant to steer the reader to thinkrnin parallel terms: a frame of mind thatrncould easily be carried into the new agernof Bill Clmton.rnKnock, an associate professor of historyrnat Southern Methodist University,rnis an admirer of “the enduring relevancyrnof [Woodrow Wilson’s] vision.” This isrnunexpected, since Knock clearly writesrnfrom the far left of the political spectrum.rnBut unlike other leftists—suchrnas Arno Meyer, William ApplemanrnWilliams, Lloyd Gardner, and N. GordonrnLewis—Knock does not interpretrnWilson’s support of the League of Nationsrnas a strategy to unite the GreatrnPowers in a reactionary alliance againstrnwodd revolution, or as a personal bid tornsteal the wodd stage from Lenin. Knockrncorrectly points out that at the time,rn”Lenin w a s . . . a comparatively obscurernpolitician at the head of a very shakyrngovernment.” Had more people in thernWest been able to foresee what the SovietrnUnion would turn into, there wouldrnhave been more support for WinstonrnChurchill’s desire to strangle communismrnin its crib. But Churchill is notrneven mentioned by Knock, who has arntalent for writing history from the perspectivernof those who lived it. Knock’srnaim is not to discredit Wilson, but to recapturernhis spirit for radicals who stillrnbelieve in progress and enlightenment.rnThe value of his book is that he also remindsrnthose on the right of the origins ofrnmany currently fashionable ideas—a refresherrncourse that is much needed.rnKnock’s diplomatic history of WorldrnWar I and the Versailles peace settlementrnamounts to a relatively small portionrnof the book, whose primary focus isrnon the development of Wilson’s ideasrnabout the proper organization of thernworld. Knock stresses the President’s influencernon such American groups as thernWomen’s Peace Party, the AmericanrnUnion Against Militarism, and the SocialistrnParty; on the Union of DemocraticrnControl in England; and on individualsrnlike Jane Addams, Upton Sinclair,rnNorman Angell, Bertrand Russell, OswaldrnGarrison Villard, and John Reed.rnWilson had always been an antiimperialist:rnduring the Mexican Revolution,rnhe clipped Reed’s columns andrncirculated them. In Mexico and LatinrnAmerica, Wilson favored revolutionaryrnidealism over concrete American interests,rnbelieving the region’s problemsrnstemmed from dependence on foreignrninvestors, including Americans. Herntherefore supported rebels who plannedrnto seize those assets. He intervened atrnVeracruz in 1916 to block a shipment ofrnweapons going to the counterrevolutionaryrnMexican government; hernapologized and paid compensation tornColumbia for the taking of Panama tornbuild the canal. He criticized the MonroernDoctrine because, while checkingrnEuropean aggression, it failed to restrainrnthe United States. He told a group ofrnMexican newspaper editors that his proposedrnPan-American Pact was “an arrangementrnby which you would be protectedrnfrom us.” When the AUAM’srnAmos Pinehot asserted that great economicrnpower made America a greatrnthreat to the world, Wilson agreed, “unlessrnsome check was placed upon it byrnsome international arrangement” like arnleague of nations.rnFor Wilson, “the reactionary opponentsrnof domestic reform and the advocatesrnof militarism, imperialism and balancc-rnof-power politics were born of thernsame womb,” says Knock. In contrast.rnKnock argues, “Feminists, liberals, pacifists,rnsocialists and social reformers ofrnvarying kinds, in the main, filled thernranks of the progressive internationalists.rnTheir leaders included many of the era’srnauthentic heroes and heroines,” all ofrnwhom, as Knock shows, enjoyed easy accessrnto Wilson’s White House.rnA conformity of outlook was displayedrnin plans drawn up by leftist groups onrnboth sides of the Atlantic at the onset ofrnthe Great War. The basic demands werernalways the same and were consolidatedrninto Wilson’s Fourteen Points: disarmament;rnfree trade; equality of nationsrnbased on self-determination; democraticrngovernments committed to social justice;rnand a league of nations that wouldrnmediate disputes and perhaps punish aggression.rnThe first two were thought tornbe the most important, on the assumptionrnthat arms races and commercial rivalryrnwere the main causes of war: if thernmilitary-industrial complex could berneliminated, opposition to the rest of thernprogram would vanish. Behind this idearnlay the notion that it is only reactionaryrnelements, not “the people,” who haverndangerous interests. Under democracy,rnthere would be only peace and “worldrncommunity.”rnA commitment to that belief is whatrnseparated the “progressive” from thern”conservative” internationalists. Menrnlike Teddy Roosevelt, Henry CabotrnLodge, Leonard Wood, William Taft,rnand Elihu Root formed the League tornEnforce Peace. But, says Knock, “almostrnall of them had been ardent imperialistsrnand champions of Anglo-American ententernsince the I890’s,” while “the LEPrndid not concern itself much with therneconomic causes of the war, with disarmamentrnor self-determination, and certainlyrnnot with democratic control ofrnforeign policy.” What the LEP envisionedrnwas something like traditional alliancesrnformed to maintain a particularrnpeace settlement, only more formal.rnThey were mainly legalists, concernedrnwith stability rather than social change.rnAnd “they remained committed nationalistsrnand resisted any diminution ofrnAmerican sovereignty or militaryrnstrength.”rnSenator Lodge turned against thernleague idea and led the fight againstrnWilson’s impossible dream. Yet,rn”Lodge’s arguments were not based onrnisolationist sentiments,” Knock believes;rninstead. Lodge wanted “a unilateralistrnapproach… which countenanced few ofrnthe restrictions on American freedom ofrnaction that Wilson’s. . . league seemedrnto entail.” In short, Lodge wanted thernUnited States to be able to act in its ownrninterest, and Wilson did not.rnAUGUST 1993/39rnrnrn