It is now 20 years since the appearancenof Jensen’s article on earlyneducation—that shot heard around thenworld, initiating the IQ controversy innits modern version. Since then, we havenwitnessed an explosion of new information,nwhich has deepened our view ofnthe issues without seriously altering itsnessential direction. Yet we find the samendivision between the psychometrician’snunderstanding of IQ and that of liberalnopinion, which continues to dominatenthe media.nNot long ago, the Today Show presentedna woman telling us that the SATnis discriminatory because girls findnsome questions harder to answer thannboys do. She was rebutted by a womannfrom the Educational Testing Servicenwho said otherwise, and who knewnwhat she was talking about — as hernadversary plainly did not. Yet bothnwomen seemed equally plausible; howncould ordinary citizens choose betweennthem? A great many no doubtntook their cue from Jane Pauley’snsmirk, signaling that yet another graveninjustice to women had been uncovered.nThe real injustice, however—tonboth men and women — may be thatnthat buzzword, “discrimination,” detersnus from examining more significantnquestions: e.g., why have the SATnscores for both sexes in the UnitednStates declined so sharply during thenlast quarter century, and why havenboys’ scores made a partial recoverynwhile girls’ scores have not? As BarbaranLerner — an authentic expert on thesenmatters — has said, disparaging thentests or doing away with them will notnhelp our youngsters, while hurting minoritiesnand women worst of all.nJoseph Adelson is a professor ofnpsychology at the University ofnMichigan in Ann Arbor.nFor Immediate ServicenChroniclesnSUBSCRIBERSnTOLL FREE NUMBERn1-800-435-0715nILLINOIS RESIDENTSn1-800-892-0753n38/CHRONICLESnThe Suez Filesnby Antony T. SullivannCutting the Lion’s Tail:nSuez Through Egyptian Eyesnby Mohamed H. HeikalnNew York: Arbor House; $18.95nOne reads this book almost withnnostalgia. The I950’s, and thendramatic events that occurred duringnthat decade in the Middle East, are thensubject of these historically importantnrecollections by Mohamed Heikal, confidantnof Gamal Abdel Nasser andndistinguished editor of the Cairo newspapernAkhbar el-Yom. Heikal remindsnus that during the 1950’s relationsnbetween the Arab worid and the Westndiffered markedly from today, and thatnNasser and other leaders eschewed thengnostic redemptionism that now sondisfigures Arab, Israeli, and Islamicnpolitics.nIn this his sixth book, Heikal completesnthe story begun in his articlesnentided “Political Inquiry,” publishednin the Egyptian press in 1958 andn1967 and continued in his 1973 book.nThe Cairo Documents: Nasser’s InternationalnRelations. Cutting the Lion’snTail is the English adaptation of Milafattnes-Suways (“The Suez Files”)npublished in Cairo in 1986. The booknis based on Heikal’s notes of his almostndaily conversations with Nasser, as wellnas on a rich lode of Egyptian archivalnmaterial. It constitutes the authoritativenEgyptian version of the nationalizationnof the Suez Canal in 1956, and thensubsequent invasion of Egypt by England,nFrance, and Israel.nHeikal also discusses many of thenother principal international issues ofnthe time: the Baghdad Pact, Egyptian-nIsraeli relations, and financing of thenAswan High Dam. While predictablynsympathetic to Nasser and many Egyptianngoals, Heikal does succeed innmaintaining a reasonable degree ofnobjectivity while recounting his fascinatingnstory.nNo issue served more to poisonnrelations between Egypt and the Westnthan the Baghdad Pact. During 1954nand 1955, Britain, Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan,nand Iran signed agreementsnpledging political and military collaborationnto resist Soviet expansionism.nThe Baghdad Pact was midwifed bynnnthe United States, which did not, however,nbecome a member. Pressure wasnexerted on Lebanon, Syria, and Jordannto join the pact. In Nasser’s view,nIsrael, rather than the USSR, presentednthe greatest threat to Arab independencenand unity. According tonHeikal, Nasser feared that if Iraq persistednin its alliance with non-Arabnpowers, and especially if other Arabnstates joined that alliance, the Arabnworld would be cut in two and Egyptnwould find itself “isolated, deprived ofnany prospect of getting arms, and leftnto face the threat of Israel alone.”nWhere Israel had divided the Arabnworld geographically, the BaghdadnPact, in Nasser’s view, threatened to donso politically. In the event, no othernArab states joined the pact, and Iraqnrepudiated its mefnbership followingnthe Iraqi revolution in 1958.nDespite his formal opposition tonIsrael as a barrier dividing the Arabnworld, Nasser’s real policy toward Israelnwas pragmatic. Heikal notes that inn1953 Nasser let David Ben-Gurionnknow that Egypt did not want a warnbecause it wished to concentrate onneconomic development (Ben-Gurion’snresponse was that this was the “worstnnews [he] had ever heard,” because andeveloped Egypt might confront Israelnwith a serious challenge). In 1955,nNasser indicated his acceptance of then1947 UN Palestine parhtion resolution.nHeikal describes the sporadic Palestiniannraids into Israel from the EgyptiannSinai and the massive Israeli militarynresponses that ended any hope fornpeace, and helped to set the stage fornthe Suez invasion of 1956.nToday there is little argument thatnAmerican cancellation .of’.its-offer, tonfinance construction of the Aswaii’nDam was one of the greatest blundersnin American diplomatic history. Hownthe USSR benefited from this Americannmisjudgment is well-known.nHeikal emphasizes what Egyptians believednto be the deliberately offensivenlanguage in John Foster Dulles’ finalnaide-memoire on the subject, and thatnstatement’s devastating impact on thencredibility of Ahmad Hussein, then-nEgyptian Ambassador to the UnitednStates and a staunch supporter of closenUS-Egyptian relations. Within only anweek Nasser struck back, announcingnthe nationalization of the Suez Canalnon July 26, 1956.n