Among the more famous of these was tornembrace uncritically the testimony ofrnMark Fuhrman, the police detective whornturned up evidence at the scene of thernmurder and at Simpson’s house, andrnwho incidentally happened to be a selfadmittedrnsociopath with a long record ofrnracist actions. Another was Clark’s allowingrnthe case to come to trial at warprnspeed, which played to the defense’s advantagernby cutting the time the prosecutionrnhad to gather evidence. Still anotherrnwas Clark’s locking her case to a timernline that allowed no small variations, nornmargin for error, and that ultimatelyrnallowed the defense to cast doubt on herrnassertions.rnToobin shows that what Marcia Clarkrndid not successfully do throughout therntrial was to convey a sense of the preponderancernof evidence of Simpson’s guilt.rnHe notes that the blood drops foundrnon Nicole Simpson’s stone pathwayrnmatched Simpson’s type, which is sharedrnby only seven percent of the Americanrnpopulation. The blood on the infamousrnglove found behind Kato Kaelin’s apartment,rntoo, was a mix of Simpson’s withrnthat of his two victims. Those gloves, laterrnthe subject of an exquisitely stupidrnmoment at the trial, were rare; Nicolernhad bought them, one of only a few hundredrnpairs made, for Simpson at a shoprnin New York City. Hair from the victimsrnwas found on the clothes Simpson hadrnworn; so were fibers from their clothing.rnPrints from his shoes were discovered atrnthe site of the murders. His Bronco wasrnseen leaving the site of the crime at thernestimated time of the murders. He hadrnno alibi. He had a fresh cut, blood on hisrnclothing, blood on his automobile. Althoughrnthe initial prosecuting attorney,rnWilliam Hodgman, wanted to amassrnfurther evidence to make the case airtight,rnhis associates urged that Simpsonrnbe arrested immediately. Simpson failedrna lie-detector test with a score of -24,rnAny score lower than -6 indicates thatrna suspect is lying. (F. Lee Bailey laterrnexplained this away unchallenged, maintainingrnthat Simpson was emotionallyrndistressed at the time of the test.)rnBut in this case, race—not evidence—rnwas what mattered. Important, too, wasrncelebrity, and in this case the celebrity ofrnO.J. Simpson and his lawyers—GerryrnSpence, Alan Dershowitz, F. Lee Bailey,rnRobert Shapiro, and Johnnie Cochranrn(in Toobin’s eyes the best of the lot)—rnwho were in the main more famous forrnbeing famous than they were for beingrngreat attorneys. None of those lawyersrnbought their own lines. All exhibitedrnwhat one distinguished jurist calls “thernindifference to truth that advocacy entails.”rnToobin offers substantial testimony tornthese lawyers’ cynicism: the defense’srnreadiness to plea-bargain for lesserrncharges the moment the evidencernthreatened to turn the jury against Simpson;rnRobert Shapiro’s wife Linell’s cheerfullyrnannouncing at cocktail parties,rn”Guilty, guilty, guilty”; Alan Dershowitz’srnequally cheerful admission,rn”Almost all of my clients have beenrnguilty”; and Johnnie Cochran’s buildingrnthroughout the trial “a Potemkin villagernof assertions.” Cochran’s masterful constructionrnof an alternate reality, Toobinrnsays, is what truly won the day for Simpson.rn”There was nothing beneath thernrhetoric. No matter; the evidence matteredrnless than what Cochran said itrnwould be. He had planted the seeds: thernLAPD was corrupt; O.J. was virtuous;rnNicole deserved what she got.”rnAn implausible defense matched withrna jury predisposed to acquit (three-quartersrnof those jurors, Toobin reports, believedrnSimpson to be innocent becausernhe was a football player, and footballrnplayers don’t murder people), an incompetentrnprosecution, an even more incompetentrnjudge whom the defensernbeat like a stolen mule: these things,rnToobin writes in this sadly damningrnbook, conspired to set O.J. Simpson free.rnGregory McNamee’s latest book is thernSierra Club Desert Reader.rnThe WashingtonrnTouchrnby Sol SchindleirnOrigins of a Catastrophernby Warren ZimmermannrnNew York: Times Books;rn257 pp., $25.00rnWarren Zimmerrnann was the lastrnAmerican Ambassador to Yugoslaviarn(from 1989 to 1992), and hisrnmemoir is of historical interest, but notrnfor reasons the author intended. WhenrnWarren Zimmermann arrived in Belgradernin 1989, Yugoslavia was still a federationrnof six republics with a federalrncabinet and government. Because of thernchanges brought about by the new constitutionrnof 1974, the centers of powerrnhad shifted from the federal to the republicanrnadministrations. Thus the newrnambassador presented his credentials notrnonly to the federal president, but calledrnupon the presidents of all the republics,rnthe sole exception being Serbia. It tookrnnearly a year—halfway through a normalrndiplomatic tour—before he could get anrnappointment to meet Slobodan Milosevic,rnthe Serbian president.rnThis extraordinary delay could only bernconstrued as a calculated insult. But whyrnwould the Serbian president want to antagonizernthe ambassador of the mostrnpowerful country on earth, a countryrnthat had through the years extended economicrnaid and worked continuously tornmaintain good relations with Yugoslavia?rnIt is clear from his account that well beforernhis arrival in Yugoslavia, AmbassadorrnZimmermann was deeply concernedrnabout the human rights situationrnin Kosovo, where ethnic Albanians werernin the majority and felt abused by thernruling Serbian government. After his arrivalrnhe expressed his concerns about thernAlbanians to a number of highly placedrnYugoslavs who, of course, reported themrnto Milosevic. He in turn would certainlyrnhave resented what he considered Americanrnmeddling in internal Yugoslav affairs.rnWhen the ambassador was invitedrnto the commemoration of the 600thrnanniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, thernbattle in which medieval Serbia lost itsrnindependence and which had been a nationalrnday of mourning since, he had notrnyet been allowed to call on Milosevic.rnHe therefore declined the invitation. Hern”made no effort to influence” the decisionsrnof others, but actions speak louderrnthan words, and, as a result, all the Europeanrnambassadors also declined. Thisrnrather puerile game of tit for tat, snub forrnsnub, benefited no one. It was not thernway a diplomat would like to begin arntour abroad.rnZimmermann tries to discredit thernnotion that ancient ethnic hatredsrncaused the civil war, arguing that Yugoslaviarnwas formed originally as a voluntaryrnassociation of south Slavs, with certainrnreligious and linguistic differencesrnthat caused no particular strife. He is, ofrncourse, correct. He fails to mention,rnhowever, the massacres of Serbs andrnCroats and Muslims during Wodd Warrn34/CHRONICLESrnrnrn