American Nationalism and Western CivilizationrnThe Limits of Buchananismrnby John O’SuUivanrnAny exploration of American nationalism must begin withrnthe National Question: “Is there such a thing as the Americanrnpeople? And if so, what is it?” Most people do not ask suchrnquestions. A Frenchman does not wonder if he is French, norrnthe Pole if he is Polish, nor—notoriously—the Serb if he is Serbian.rnHe knows very well that he is what he is, and he has littlernor no difficulty in distinguishing himself from somebody elsernwith a different national identity.rnSuch questions of identity typically signal a conflict —rnwhether a conflict within the individual soul or an actual donnybrookrnin the streets. When an Ulsterman declares defiantlyrnthat he is British, it is probably in response to the assertion ofrnIrish nationalists that to be an Ulsterman signifies not a nationalrnidentity different from the Irish one but merely a cultural orrnregional “tradition” within it. Similarly, when a Canadian intellectualrndescribes his national identity as consisting of thernlandscape and extensive social services—what might be calledrnsoil and bloodlessness—it is because he is papering over a conflictrnbetween two real national identities, the French Quebeckerrnand the English Canadian. And when someone describesrnhimself as a European, it means either that he is in Asia orrnAfrica at the time, or that he is an employee of the EuropeanrnCommission in Brussels.rnThese three cases are, of course, very different. The Ulstermanrnis resisting an identity that is being thrust upon him; thernCanadian intellectual has lost an identity and is looking for a replacement,rnpreferably one without any embarrassingly “patriotic”rnor provincial overtones; and the “European” has invented arnnew one and is trying to impose it on other people. But all threern]ohn O’SuUivan is the former editor ofNational Review. Thisrnarticle is based on a speech he gave at last year’s John RandolphrnClub meeting.rncases illustrate that a national identity, however real and deeplyrnrooted, can suddenly find itself up against a question mark.rnIt can go from the realm of necessity into that of freedom —inrnevers’day language, it can cease to seem natural and taken forrngranted and come to seem artificial and a matter of choice.rnWhen it does so, the result will be inner doubt and unhappinessrnand social, political, legal, and constitutional conflict. Existingrninstitutions that were props of the old national identit}’rnwill be criticized as the ancien regime, and new institutions willrnbe brought into being to express the new identities that are beingrnshaped and perhaps pressed upon people. Something ver)-rnlike this is now happening in the United Kingdom with the proposalsrnfor a Scottish parliament, for judicial review on thernAmerican model, and for the subordination of Parliament to arnEuropean legal system being introduced by Mr, Blair’s Labourrngovernment. Indeed, Britain’s serviceable unwritten constitutionrnis now routinely dismissed as the ancien regime, and Mr.rnBlair boasts that Britain is being “re-branded” internationally asrn”Cool Britannia.” .AJl of which suggests that the British are beingrntransformed from a nation of shopkeepers into one of advertisingrncopywriters.rnThe national question in the United States is now very evidentlyrnon the political agenda—though no politician will admitrnit openly. We can tell this easily enough by reading the newspapersrnor watching television. Let me take a few examples, chosenrnat random:rn1) A rally in Los Angeles opposing Proposition 187 fourrnyears ago featured thousands of people waving Mexicanrnflags. Proposition 187 nonetheless passed by a large majority.rnIt was then held up until last December by a federalrnjudge who first refused to rule upon it at all—whichrnmeant that her ruling could not be reversed on appeal —rn20/CHRONlCLESrnrnrn