Mayne’s liberal slant is also apparent innhis analysis of the cause of WesternnEtirope’s brilliant postwar economicnachievement. He attributes this successnto go-ernment planning and welfarenpolicies, i-idh’ contrasting theneconomic stagnation of the allegedlynlaissez-faire interwar economics s’ithnthe prosperit}- of the postwar plannednwelfare states. This comparison, however,nis specious since the interwarnEuropean economies were tar from free.nThe cartelized economies of nazi Germanynand fascist Italy were far morenrestrictive than their postwar counterparts.nAnd thougli not as extreme, othernEuropean countries during the interwarnperiod were permeated with variousnimpediments to economic freedom,nprotectionist trade barriers, in particular,nhi realit)’, the cause of the postwarnprosperity may not have been greaterngovernrnent planning but freer economicnmarkets. As Mancur Olson points outnin The Rise and Decline of Nations, warsn(and he includes World War II) inevitablynenhance economic freedom bynbreaking down the numerous specialninterest groups and combinations thatnhave accumulated during the priornperiod of peace and stability. As theseninpediments have once again accumulated,nso has Western Europe’s economicnIn the Mailngrovth ceased,nTlie so-far unmiswercd question is thenrelationship beD>veen the current Europeannmalaise and its dazzling recoven,- ofnthe early postw;ir T,-ears, Wliile Mayne isnnot unaware of some flav^’s in postwarnEuropean society—a small minoritynoutside of the general ;iffluence; intellectualsnalienated by industrial ci’ilizationn—these are not gi^•en much significance,nHo\’ever, as Raymond Aron points outnhi 111 Defense of Decadent Europe, soci;ilndecadence almost necessarily accompaniesnadvances in material well-beingnand individual liberty. Material wellbeingnand personal liberty erode thendeeply felt collective beliefs that arenessential for a society’s ultimate survival.nWhile the consequences of this problemnwere not readily apparent duringnEurope’s early rebuilding stage, thengerms of this deadly virus were alreadyninside the social body.n”ostwar Western Europe has eliminatednthe fervent ethnic nationalism thatncaused the internecine warfare andnother forms of suffering and oppressionnin Europe’s recent past. The eliminationnof that old collective loyalty created thenprecondition for postwar progress.nToleration of ethnic differences allowedndemocracy and personal liberty tonoperation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon by Richard A. Gabriel;nHill & Wang; New York. An examination of, primarily, tlie Israeli Defense Force in Lebanon andna questioning of wliat “defense” means in that context.nThe Manciple’s Tale, Volume II, Part 10, Ihe Variorum Chaucer edited by Donald C.nBaker; University of Oklahoma Press; Norman, OK. Another gorgeous yet scholarly volumentor Chaucerites only.nTo Make Democracy Safe for America: Patricians and Preparedness in thenProgressive Era by Michael Pearlman; University of Illinois Press; Urbana, IL. A look atnthe history’ of universal military training—or tlMT, as the insiders designate it.nA Legend of Saint Dismas and Other Poems by Peter Gallwey; Ignatius Press; SannFrancisco. Poems that arc unashamed to present “Gospel tniths and higli thoughts.” It shouldncome as no surprise that they were written around the turn of the century.nReason within the Bounds of Religion by Nicholas Wolterstorff; Wm. B. Eerdmans;nGrand Rapids, MI. An enlarged edition of the 1976 book that insists that the Gospel play a role innmatters of rea.son.nChronicles of Culturennnflourish. The elimination of nationalnhatreds pro-ided the internationalnpeace and open frontiers essential forninternational commerce—a fuiiclamentaincause of posnvar prosperity, just asninterMir nationalistic protectionism hadnbeen a cause of economic depression,n’llie end of European imperialism meantnthat the continent could concentrate itsnattention and wealth on internal affairs.nThe dissolution of nationalisni, however,nh;LS been a mixed blessing, for it h;LSnleft Europeans without any compellingncollecti’e belief W’Tiile nationalisiri hasndecayed, no fervent Europcanism hasnemerged as a replacement. (Vestigialnnationalism has been sufficient to blocknefforts for greater European integration).nAs a consequence, postwar Europeannnational and transnational institutionsnare critically lacking the ferventnideological commitment needed tonmotivate people to make sacrifices forntheir own defense. In the past, millions ofnEuropeans were willing to risk death forntheir homelands, even if their governmentsndid little to benefit them, or if, innfact, their governments were engaged innruthless aggression rather than actualndefense. Today, however, few Europeansnseein willing to die in the defensenof governments and institutions thatnhave obviously treated them muchnbetter than their earlier counterparts. Itnis because of this lack of a strong ideologicalnunderpinning that Western Europenhas been unable to defend itself, despitenits great wealth and more-than-adequatenpopulation base.nM uch has been made of WesternnEurope’s incomplete political integrationnas a cause of its inilitar)’ impotence.nYet there is no material reason fornWestern Europe not to establish ansufficient military deterrent even in itsnpresent political form. The 5th-centurynB.C. Greek cit)’-states were much morenpolitically disunited than present-daynWestern Europe, yet they prevailednagainst the mighty Persian Empire.nToday, numerically small and impoverishednAfghan freedom figltters aren