Morality or ethics requires free will and a standard ofnvalue. Philosophers have debated these issues for as long asnwe have been aware of them, and they will continue to donso. But this does not mean there is no answer, only thatnanswers are not easy or uncontroversial.nAs far as the issue of free will is concerned, this is vital fornthe present discussion, because a standard of value concerningnanimal life is not that difficult to identify. It simplynconsists of whatever enhances their health and welfare. Thisncan sometimes involve the complications of psychologicalnwell-being; but even here matters can be quite straightforward.nWe are able to know, to a great extent, when animalsnare well, when they are ill.nBut the idea of well-being does not make moralitynrelevant to anipials, unless one tends to confuse valuentheory with morality. Hedonism and to some degreenutilitarianism do tend in this direction. From these perspectives,nall that is at stake is maximizing pleasure or somenother measurable value. But that is one reason why utilitariansnand hedonists have a difficult time with morality.nThe moral viewpoint requires a concern for what wenought to do, not just with what is good and bad. We couldnwell hae a theory of good and bad but still no idea what wenought to do, since moral obligation is also concerned withnwhat we can do, our freedom to choose. This is why thenfree-will issue is crucial for this debate.nIt is interesting that the animal liberation movementnfalters exactly where it needs to make its case most definitelyn—whether or not animals are every bit as sovereign a part ofnnature as human beings. The justification for humannsovereignty is our capacity to choose a line of conduct, asnwell as the responsibility to choose it well, properly. Tonmake room for this in society, w^e. identify certain rights andnestablish legal means for protecting them.’nHowever, animals do not possess free will and thus arennot faced with the moral task of choosing their conductnwell. Therefore, the same claim cannot be made for them.nFor something to have rights—to deserve liberation—itnmust be able to exercise these rights or the liberty to choose.nAnimals would have no use for these rights, not in the sensenin which human beings do.nSome human beings also lack free will and moralnresponsibility—very young children, those in a coma, ornthe senile and retarded. These last are even less easily seennas able to make use of any human rights to freedom,nalthough some find this troublesome about children as well.nNevertheless, the position of these human beings isndifferent from that of animals. A child is, of course, only anyoung human being and thus at the beginning point fornnnpersonhood. The matter is not easy to sort out but neither isnit difficult to see that this does not make children equivalentnof nonhuman animals. With the senile and retarded wenactually understand that they lack certain rights of fullnpersonhood. But we also admit that the presumption shouldnalways lie in favor of membership in the human species.nThere are many problems associated with any plan tonelevate animals to personhood, with the rights and freedomnof human beings. For example, animals kill each other,nsometimes even when they belong to the same species, andnit would be absurd to charge them with murder. Wouldnanimal rights require that they be prosecuted in a court ofnlaw? What of other aspects of animal relations? As one criticnof moral vegetarianism asked, “Who should not eat meat,nor what does a vegetarian feed his dog?” (Michael Martin,nReason Papers, Fall 1976). How, after all, would we feednthe animals within our care? We could not use food madenof other animals, at least not much of it—outside of whatncould be garnered from the natural death of animals (andnhumans?). Would we be obliged to sacrifice our well-beingnfor the sake of animals in danger of dying?nProfessor Peter Singer once noted that “Animal Liberationnwill require greater altruism on the part of mankindnthan any other liberation movement, since animals arenincapable of demanding it for themselves, or of protestingnagainst their exploitation by votes, demonstration, ornbombs” (New York Review of Books, April 5, 1973). He isnundoubtedly correct, but that is scarcely a reasonablenjustification for animal liberation. It does, however, raisensome thorny questions about the scope of altruism.nHuman beings should be more aware of the feelings ofnfellow sentient beings. Failure to do so indicates a lacknof compassion and sensitivity. But compassion is one thing,nanimal liberation another. Human beings are special partsnof nature and often must make use of the rest of nature forntheir own benefit, even pleasure. In a culture in which thendoctrine of altruism is widely promulgated, this may benfutile advice. More likely, people will continue to entertainna schizophrenic outlook. They will both seek their ownnwell-being and pleasure, even happiness, and at the samentime feel guilty about it, and lend their support to movementsnwhich would extinguish their chances for happinessnon earth. This sort of hypocrisy can be dangerous. It wouldnbe much better to admit outright that we value ourselvesnmore than other animals, be proud to do so, and thennextend reasonable care to other animals. This would, Inthink, be best not only for us but also for the animalsnconcerned. ccnAUGUST 198S25n