221 CHRONICLESntheir choice. Marchenko refused, although his wife isnJewish. First, because he himself was not Jewish, andnsecond, because he regarded Jewish emigration as a meansnof inspiring envy and anti-Semitic feelings in other Sovietnnationalities. Everyone should be free to emigrate, was hisnnonnegotiable position. For himself, he wanted a passport tonthe United States. Not granted. When friends tried tonpersuade him, “Why don’t you leave, Tolya?” his answernwas typically childish and pure: “Why don’t they leave?”nDina Kaminskaya, the lawyer who once defendednMarchenko, recalled a meeting with him in 1968, during anbrief period of freedom before his arrest in August. She sawna man with a pale face, a very reserved manner of speakingnand an ailing body. Fearing for his life, she pleaded with hisnwife to persuade him to give it up. Bogoraz answered thatn”Tolya” had made up his mind and could not be turnednfrom his cause. Kaminskaya then addressed Marchenkonhimself with the same plea. His calm answer, as she relatednin the New York Russian-language newspaper NovoyenRusskoye S/ovo, has stuck in her mind ever since: “It’s worthnit. For this it’s not too much to sacrifice your life.”nThis inspiring example burns the old-guardists in thenSoviet Union. At the end of April last year, the newspapernTrud (“Labor”) published a violent attack on Marchenko’snmemory by Yury Vasiliev. With old-style, pie-glasnostninvective, Vasiliev villified Marchenko as a liar, falsifier,ncriminal, corrupter of youth, sluggard, fascist, traitor, andncollaborator with foreign anti-Soviet organizations. He evenndragged in Marchenko’s mother with a complaint that Tolyanshould have finished school. Vasiliev brazenly quotednmaterials not made available to Bogoraz at the same timenthat he impugned her veracity. This vulgar calumny provokednletters of protest from Soviet human rights activistsnwhich found their way into samizdat. One such letter wasnreproduced in the new magazine Glasnost put out by SergeinGrigoryants, a former fellow-prisoner with Marchenko atnChistopol.nMarchenko sacrificed his life to one cause: real pravda.n(The word means both “truth” and “justice.”) In today’sncurrent phrases, this translates into real glasnost, realndemokratizatsiya, real perestroika. We are grateful for thenrelease of Soviet prisoners: losif Begun, Mikhail Rivkin,nValery Senderov, Sergei Grigoryants, Yegor Volkov, andnmany others. Yet others take their place in prison. NatannShcharansky reminds us that there are five million people innGulag, plus six million tied to Gulag. The number ofnprisoners of conscience can only be estimated. Shcharanskynestimates five to ten thousand confined on purely politicalncharges. As of this writing, no general amnesty for prisonersnsentenced under Article 70 or 190-1 has been effected, nornhave these infamous articles been revoked. The individualnamnesties come as acts of grace, not as a legal process ofncorrection and recompense for imprisonments that werenwrong.nThe world looks with hope to the new developments innSoviet Russia. But we should not be satisfied with halfmeasures,nhalf-truths, half-freedoms. Marchenko set thenstandard. He was a man not for a day and not for a year, butnfor a whole lifetime. In total physical ruin and total spiritualnmight he made the complete statement.nSOVIET NUCLEAR WAR POLICIESnby Richard F. StaarnAmericans are perennially tempted to believe that Sovietnarmament is a reaction to American armament, andntherefore reversible by American disarmament. For years wenallowed that hope to guide our military policy: beginning innthe late 1960’s, the United States exercised unilateralnrestraint in nuclear construction for more than a decade.nAmerican-produced IGBM warheads were deliberately designednto be ineffective against Soviet missile silos. Byncontrast, Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 warheads were built fornmaximum effectiveness against US silos. After the ABMntreaty (1972), most American air defenses were dismantled,nwhereas the Soviets worked feverishly to improve their ownnand acquire the technology for an improved ABM system.nSo went the era of detente.nBut the Soviet nuclear drive has roots in the beginning ofnRichard Staar is coordinator of the international studiesnprogram at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.nHe served as US ambassador to the conventional armsnreduction talks (1981-1983) in Vienna, Austria, and isncoauthor with William T. Lee of Soviet Military PolicynSince World War 11.nnnthe nuclear age. In August 1945, a directive from the rulingnparty’s central committee ordered that the US monopolynover atomic weapons be broken and delivery systemsndeveloped as soon as possible. More than 1,000 TU-4nbombers (copies of the B-29) were produced and the firstnballistic missile was flight-tested in October 1947. During anninterview, Khrushchev revealed that ABM research andndevelopment had started when ICBM’s were first conceivedn(New York Times, September 8, 1961). As the table belownindicates, the Soviets deployed three major systems ahead ofnthe United States.nThe basic tenets of Soviet military doctrine and strategynwere formulated during 1953-1960, i.e., after Stalin’s death,nand Moscow dates its own “nuclear revolution in militarynaffairs” from the time of Khrushchev’s statement on thennew doctrine before the Supreme Soviet (Pravda, Januaryn15, 1960). Based on Russian-language publications, thenfollowing principles emerge: a war with the West will be thenthird and decisive conflict for world domination; a nuclearnwar should be avoided, although national liberation movementsnand revolutionary wars must be supported; if deterrencenfails, the East must win by limiting damage to thenUSSR and ensuring viability of assets.nSoviet nuclear strikes must be decisive and followed by ancombined arms offensive against Western Europe. Priorityn