VIEWSrnThe Yugoslav MythologyrnA Multicultural Pathologyrnby Tomislav Sunicrn•sivaifrn- f > ^yy ^•••rn’Ki ^tK-rrnOne must agree with Georges Sorel that poHtical mythsrnhave a long and durable life. For 74 years the Yugoslavrnstate drew its legitimacy from the spirit of Versailles and Yalta,rnas well as from the Serb-inspired pan-Slavic mythology. Byrncarefully manipulating the history of their constituent peoplesrnwhile glorifying their own, Yugoslav leaders managed to convincernthe world that Yugoslavia was a “model multiethnicrnstate.” Many global-minded pundits in the West followedrnsuit and made a nice career preaching the virtues of the Yugoslavrnmultiethnic pot. By tirelessly vaunting the Yugoslavrnmodel, scores of starry-eyed Western academics gave, bothrnpedagogically and psychologically, additional legitimacy to artificialrnYugoslavia. In 1991, faced with massive geopoliticalrntremors, stretching from Siberia to Spain, the Yugoslav mythologyrnbegan cracking up, and with it, its multiethnic mystique.rnThe sudden beginning of the democratization of Yugoslaviarnled, naturally, to the country’s demise, the bloody postscript tornwhich is yet to unfold.rnNothing seemed easier for the European Community andrnthe United Nations than to describe the 1991 Serbian aggressionrnagainst Croatia as a Serbo-Croat tribal war. At the be-rnTomislav Sunic teaches political science at ]uniata College inrnPennsylvania.rnginning of the conflict, France, America, and a gallery of facelessrnU.N. mediators shrugged off Serbian territorial appetites byrncalling them the result of an ancient Serbo-Croat balkanesquernfeud. After all, why would big powers have to intervene in anrnarea of Europe that, according to their definition of internationalrnlaw, offered no precise definition of the aggressor vs. thernvictim? The paralysis of the United Nations and EuropeanrnCommunity was seen by the Serbs as a green light to salvagernYugoslavia by force—even if that meant destroying it by force.rnAs self-declared victims of hard times and soft former allies, thernSerbs are today angry at France and America. These tworncountries once offered them Yugoslavia—only to strip them ofrnit today.rnIn retrospect, the good guys appear to be those who definernthe international system, which in 1993, unlike in 1919 andrn1945, does not well suit the Serbs. By detour, we could refer tornEdward Carr’s dictum that before we study history we mustrnfirst study the historian—if we are to decide who to side withrnin the Balkans. Historically, the “Greater Serbia” mythologyrnhas functioned only by wallowing in victimology—even asrnSerbs victimized the Other. In the latest spasm of this endlessrnvictimology, Serbs are today heaping their anger for the collapsernof Yugoslavia on everybody: the Vatican, Muslims, thernCIA, the Fourth Reich, and, of course, always available nearbyrn22/CHRONlCLESrnrnrn