Three Bads and an ExcellentnLet’s say that you have an enthusiasm for golf, tennis, orndining out but hve in an area in which the necessary facihtiesnare available exclusively on a membership basis in privatenclubs. Assume also that any very extended exclusion fromnthese activities leaves you bored, dejected, morose. In thesencircumstances, and on the added assumption that you andnyour intimates lack the resources to build and maintain yournown course or court, hire your own chef, etc., membership innthe requisite organizations or associations will be of great importancento you. Whereas friends with other avocations are indifferentnto the rights and privileges of these memberships,nfor you they will be a matter of concern, perhaps quite intenselynso.nConsider an importantly different circumstance. You live inna “company town” (such as late 19th-century Pullman, Illinois),nin a region dominated by a single industry, firm, orntrade union (such as Akron, Ohio), or in a self-conscious andnwell-organized ethnic group or religious confession (as in thenMormon communities in Utah), where employment opportunities,nqualified medical services, schools, shopping and servicenfacilities, perhaps even dependable fire and security protectionsnare reliably available only to those who have definitenand stable standing with the local hegemon. In this circumstance,nstatus or eligibility, rather than being a matter of gratificationsnand enjoyments or their absence, is a condition necessarynto the satisfaction of your most basic interests and needs.nThe question whether you can or cannot obtain and sustainnsuch standing will be second in importance to few others.nIn the cases I have imagined, membership takes its importancenprimarily from the direct connection between it andnaccess to valued goods, services, and opportunities. The rights,nprivileges, and immunities that come with it are to states of affairsnthat are valued for their own sake. If I could assure myselfnof these desired states of affairs by means other than membership,nand if it were more convenient or less costly to donso, membership would have little or no value to me. Equally, ifnthe associations or groups ceased to provide the goods or ser-nRichard E. Flathman is a professor of political science atnJohns Hopkins University and author, most recently, ofnWillful Liberalism.nFour Ways of Thinking About Citizenshipnby Richard E. Flathmannvices, or began to provide them at a substantially reduced levelnof quality or convenience, I might well discontinue mynmembership.nBefore turning to the distinctive form of membership calledncitizenship, consider cases (which might overlap or coincidenwith those discussed thus far) in which membership is valuednless for the opportunities it affords or the needs it meetsnthan for the human interactions and relationships that developnbecause of or as a part of it. There are plenty of goodnrestaurants in town and a trial visit suffices to show that thenfood at the Elks Club is lousy. My wife and I neverthelessnseek membership in the club because we are keen to meetnnew people. We continue our membership long after we havensatisfied this urge because of an emotional linkage between thenclub and friendships formed there. Similarly, “The recentlynopened municipal golf course is cheaper and better maintainednthan my private club but the rest of my foursome wantsnto play at the club so. . . .” “I now think that the doctrines ofnthe church are superstitious nonsense but my dear friends Judynand Ralph would be dismayed if I stopped attending servicesnand so. .. .” “My union (political party, Ku Klux BClan chapter,ngay rights group) has become hopelessly ineffective in promotingnmy interests and protecting my rights, but I wouldn’tngive up my comradely relations for the wodd.” “If asked to betraynmy country (my church, union, university, political party)nto save my friends, I hope I would have the decency andncourage to do it.”nAll of the above ways of thinking have been transferred tonthe form of membership called citizenship in “the state” andnoffered as reasons for elevating citizenship to a position of specialnprivilege. As to the first or gratification model, eudaemonistsnand hedonistic utilitarians from Plato and Aristotlento Bentham, despite disagreeing radically as to the nature ofnpleasure, have sung the praises of politically organized associationnas the chief source of human happiness. Hegel, Bradley,nLenin, and the democratic socialists and welfare liberals ofnour own time, despite much scorn for one another’s conceptionsnof the true human interests, needs, or ends have adaptednthe second or need and interest model to political theory.nThey have trumpeted the refrain that human needs and interestsncan be satisfied, met, and achieved only where there isnnnJULY 1992/29n